Welcome to the resource topic for 2025/647
Title:
Anamorphic Voting: Ballot Freedom Against Dishonest Authorities
Authors: Rosario Giustolisi, Mohammadamin Rakeei, Gabriele Lenzini
Abstract:Electronic voting schemes typically ensure ballot privacy by
assuming that the decryption key is distributed among tallying authorities, preventing any single authority from decrypting a voter’s ballot.
However, this assumption may fail in a fully dishonest environment where
all tallying authorities collude to break ballot privacy.
In this work, we introduce the notion of anamorphic voting, which enables voters to convey their true voting intention to an auditor while
casting an (apparently) regular ballot. We present new cryptographic
techniques demonstrating that several existing voting schemes can support anamorphic voting.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/647
See all topics related to this paper.
Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.
Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.
For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .