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Title:
A Complete Security Proof of SQIsign
Authors: Marius A. Aardal, Andrea Basso, Luca De Feo, Sikhar Patranabis, Benjamin Wesolowski
Abstract:SQIsign is the leading digital signature from isogenies. Despite the many improvements that have appeared in the literature, all its recents variants lack a complete security proof. In this work, we provide the first full security proof of SQIsign, as submitted to the second round of NIST’s on-ramp track for digital signatures.
To do so, we introduce a new framework, which we call Fiat-Shamir with hints, that captures all those protocols where the simulator needs additional information to simulate a transcript. Using this framework, we show that SQIsign is EUF-CMA secure in the ROM, assuming the hardness of the One Endomorphism problem with hints, or the hardness of the Full Endomorphism Ring problem with hints together with a hint indistinguishability assumption; all assumptions, unlike previous ones in the literature, are non-interactive. Along the way, we prove several intermediate results that may be of independent interest.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/379
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