[Resource Topic] 2025/1830: A New Approach to Improved PNB-based Attacks on Reduced-round ChaCha and Salsa

Welcome to the resource topic for 2025/1830

Title:
A New Approach to Improved PNB-based Attacks on Reduced-round ChaCha and Salsa

Authors: Goutam Paul, Anup Kumar Kundu, Sucheta Chakrabarti

Abstract:

ChaCha and Salsa are two ARX based stream ciphers which are widely used in data encryption including TLS v1.3 standard, VPN software etc. Exploiting Probabilistic Neutral Bits (PNB) is one of the most significant cryptanalysis strategies for reduced round versions of these ciphers. The seminal work using PNB by Aumasson et al. (FSE 2008) claims that the PNB set mostly depends on the output bit difference occurring in the intermediate round. The subsequent works mainly relied on the differential or differential-linear cryptanalysis, or multiple distinct input-output differentials for which the bias is higher than a threshold in the intermediate round. In this paper, we propose a new PNB set construction based on multiple output bit differences with respect to a single input bit difference only. We exploit the differentials to mount key recovery attacks using a multi-step procedure depending on our new PNB set. Our attack achieves a time complexity of 2^{167.9008} for ChaCha20/7 and 2^{183.5361} for Salsa20/8, beating all the existing PNB-based attacks on ChaCha20/7 and Salsa20/8 by a significant margin. Further, both our time and data complexities for ChaCha20/7.5 are better than the latest published work by Flórez-Gutiérrez and Todo (Eurocrypt 2025). We have also verified our attack experimentally on a published toy version of ChaCha (FSE 2023).

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1830

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