[Resource Topic] 2025/1452: Not Easy to Prepare a Pesto: Cryptanalysis of a Multivariate Public-Key Scheme from CCZ Equivalence

Welcome to the resource topic for 2025/1452

Title:
Not Easy to Prepare a Pesto: Cryptanalysis of a Multivariate Public-Key Scheme from CCZ Equivalence

Authors: Christof Beierle, Patrick Felke

Abstract:

Multivariate cryptography is one of the challenging candidates for post-quantum cryptography. There exists a huge variety of proposals, most of them have been broken substantially. Multivariate schemes are usually constructed by applying two secret affine invertible transformations \mathcal S,\mathcal T to a set of multivariate
polynomials \mathcal{F} (often quadratic). The secret polynomials \mathcal{F}
possess a trapdoor that allows the legitimate user to find a solution of the
corresponding system, while the public polynomials \mathcal G=\mathcal S\circ\mathcal F\circ\mathcal T look like random polynomials. In [Calderini, M., Caminata, A., Villa, I. A New Multivariate Primitive from CCZ Equivalence. J. Cryptol. 38, 25 (2025)], the authors addressed the above challenge by presenting a promising new way of constructing a multivariate scheme by considering the CCZ equivalence, which has been introduced and studied in the context of vectorial Boolean functions. The resulting proposal is called Pesto with security parameters s,t,m,n,q, where n is the number of variables, s,t,m\leq n and q the size of the finite base field \mathbb{F}_q. In this paper we present an attack against Pesto by constructing an equivalent secret key from the public key. This attack has a precomputation phase with a complexity of [\textrm{max}\left{{\mathcal{O}\left(n^{6}(m-t)\right),\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{(m-t)(n-t)^2(n-t-s)q^s}{\mathcal{P}(q,n-t-s)}\right)}\right}]
base field operations on average and an online complexity of [\mathcal{O}(q^s(m-t)(n-t-s) \cdot \min(m-t,n-t-s) + q^st (n-t)^2 + q^st^3)] base field operations to decipher a message or forge a signature, where \mathcal{P}(q,k) := \prod_{i=1}^k (1-1/q^i).
Thus, our attack breaks Pesto for any practical choice of the security parameters n,m,s,t,q and renders the concrete construction underlying Pesto insecure.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1452

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