Welcome to the resource topic for 2025/1341
Title:
Practical Attack on All Parameters of the HPPC Signature Scheme
Authors: Pierre Briaud, Maxime Bros, Ray Perlner, Daniel Smith-Tone
Abstract:HPPC is a multivariate signature scheme submitted to the NIST PQC standardization process in response to the recent call for additional signature schemes. We show that, despite some non-standard notational choices in the submission document, HPPC can be viewed as a special case of the well-studied, but broken for all practical parameters, HFE signature scheme. We further show that the HPPC construction introduces additional structure that further weakens the scheme. For instance, the central map has Q-rank 2 independently from the degree D of the central polynomial that is used.
Using these observations, we show that HPPC is weaker against the direct attack than claimed in the submission document and more crucially that all parameter sets can be practically broken using MinRank techniques. For instance, with a very naive implementation, we have been able to recover an equivalent key in approximately 8 minutes for security level 2, an hour and a half for security level 4, and slightly more than 7 hours for security level 5.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1341
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