Welcome to the resource topic for 2025/1235
Title:
HiAE Remains Secure in Its Intended Model: A Clarification of Claimed Attacks
Authors: Han Chen, Tao Huang, Phuong Pham, Shuang Wu
Abstract:HiAE is a recently proposed high-throughput authenticated encryption algorithm that achieves exceptional performance on both x86 and ARM architectures. Following its publication, several cryptanalysis papers have claimed that HiAE’s 256-bit encryption security is broken under the nonce-respecting model. In this note, we clarify that the claimed attacks rely critically on submitting forged-tag decryption queries — a type of behavior explicitly excluded by HiAE’s original security model.
HiAE was designed under a standard nonce-based AEAD setting without decryption oracle access, offering 256-bit security against key and state recovery, and 128-bit security against forgery. This design approach follows the same principle as well-known schemes such as AEGIS and MORUS.
The conclusion that HiAE is broken is based on a misinterpretation of its security model, as the attacks rely on conditions that the design explicitly excludes.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1235
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