[Resource Topic] 2024/452: Modeling Mobile Crash in Byzantine Consensus

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Modeling Mobile Crash in Byzantine Consensus

Authors: Hans Schmiedel, Runchao Han, Qiang Tang, Ron Steinfeld, Jiangshan Yu


Targeted Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks have been a practical concern
for permissionless blockchains. Potential solutions, such as random
sampling, are adopted by blockchains.
However, the associated security guarantees have only been informally discussed in prior work. This
is due to the fact that existing adversary models are either not
fully capturing this attack or giving up certain design choices
(as in the sleepy model or asynchronous network model), or too strong to
be practical (as in the mobile Byzantine adversary model).

This paper provides theoretical foundations and desired properties
for consensus protocols that resist against targeted DoS attacks. In particular, we
define the Mobile Crash Adaptive Byzantine (MCAB) model to capture such an attack. In addition, we
identify and formalize two properties for consensus protocols under the MCAB model, and analyze their trade-offs.
As case studies, we prove that Ouroboros Praos and Algorand are secure in our MCAB model, giving the first formal proofs supporting their security guarantee against targeted DoS attacks, which were previously only informally discussed.
We also illustrate an application of our properties to secure a streamlined BFT protocol, chained Hotstuff, against targeted DoS attacks.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/452

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