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Title:
On the cryptosystems based on two Eulerian transfor-mations defined over the commutative rings Z_{2^s}, s>1.
Authors: Vasyl Ustimenko
Abstract:We suggest the family of ciphers s^E^n, n=2,3,… with the space of plaintexts (Z*{2^s})^n, s >1 such that the encryption map is the composition of kind G=G_1A_1G_2A_2 where A_i are the affine transformations from AGL_n(Z{2^s}) preserving the variety (Z*{2^s)}^n , Eulerian endomorphism G_i , i=1,2 of K[x_1, x_2,…, x_n] moves x_i to monomial term ϻ(x_1)^{d(1)}(x_2)^{d(2)}…(x_n)^{d(n)} , ϻϵ Z*{2^s} and act on (Z*{2^s})^n as bijective transformations.
The cipher is converted to a protocol supported cryptosystem. Protocols of Noncommutative Cryptography implemented on the platform of Eulerian endomorphism are used for the delivery of G_i and A_i from Alice to Bob. One can use twisted Diffie-Hellman protocols which security rests on the complexity of Conjugacy Power problem or hidden tame homomorphism protocol which security rests of the word decomposition problem. Instead of the delivery of G_i Alice and Bob can elaborate these transformations via the inverse twisted Diffie-Hellman protocol implemented on the platform of tame Eulerian transformations of (Z*{2^s})^n. The cost of single protocol is O(n^3) and the cost of the computation of the reimage of used nonlinear map is O(n^2). So the verification of n^t , t≥1 signatures takes time O(n^{t+2}). Instead of inverse twisted Diffie-Hellman protocol correspondents can use inverse hidden tame homomorphism protocol which rests on the complexity of word decomposition for tame Eulerian transformations. We use natural bijections between Z*{2^s} and Z{2^{s-1}}, Z*{2^s} and finite field F{2^{s-1}} and Z*{2^s} and Boolean ring B{s-1} of order 2^{s-1} to modify the family of ciphers or cryptosystems via the change of AGL_n(Z_{2^s}) for the AGL_n(K), where K is one of the rings
Z_{2^{s-1}, F_{2^{s-1} and B_{s-1}. New ciphers are defined via the multiplications of two different commutative rings Z_{2^s} and K. It does not allow to treat them as stream ciphers of multivariate cryptography and use corresponding cryptanalytic technique.
Adversary is not able to use known cryptanalytical methods such as linearisation attacks. We discuss the option of change the mentioned above elements of AGL_n(Z_{2^s) or AGL_n(K) for nonlinear multivariate transformation F of (Z_{2^s})^n or K^n with the symmetric trapdoor accelerator T, i.e. the piece of information such that the knowledge of T allows to compute the value F(p) in arbitrarily chosen p ϵ P in time O(n^2) and to solve the equation of kind F(x)=c for each c from C in time O(n ^2).
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/319
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