Welcome to the resource topic for 2024/1947
Title:
One-More Unforgeability for Multi- and Threshold Signatures
Authors: Sela Navot, Stefano Tessaro
Abstract:This paper initiates the study of one-more unforgeability for multi-signatures and threshold signatures as a stronger security goal, ensuring that ℓ executions of a signing protocol cannot result in more than ℓ signatures. This notion is widely used in the context of blind signatures, but we argue that it is a convenient way to model strong unforgeability for other types of distributed signing protocols. We provide formal security definitions for one-more unforgeability (OMUF) and show that the HBMS multi-signature scheme does not satisfy this definition, whereas MuSig and MuSig2 do. We also show that mBCJ multi-signautres do not satisfy OMUF, as well as expose a subtle issue with their existential unforgeability (which does not contradict their original security proof). For threshold signatures, we show that FROST satisfies OMUF, but ROAST does not.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1947
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