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Title:
Giant Does NOT Mean Strong: Cryptanalysis of BQTRU
Authors: Ali Raya, Vikas Kumar, Aditi Kar Gangopadhyay, Sugata Gangopadhyay
Abstract:NTRU-like constructions are among the most studied lattice-based schemes. The freedom of design of NTRU resulted in many variants in literature motivated by faster computations or more resistance against lattice attacks by changing the underlying algebra. To the best of our knowledge, BQTRU (DCC 2017), a noncommutative NTRU-like cryptosystem, is the fastest claimed variant of NTRU built over the quaternion algebra of the bivariate ring of polynomials. The key generation and the encryption of BQTRU are claimed to be 16/7 times faster than standard NTRU for equivalent levels of security. For key recovery attacks, the authors claim that retrieving a decryption key is equivalent to solving the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) in expanded Euclidean lattices of giant dimensions. This work disproves this claim and proposes practical key and message recovery attacks that break the moderate parameter sets of BQTRU estimated to achieve 2^{92} message security and 2^{166} key security on a standard desktop within less than two core weeks. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the proposed parameter set for the highest security level claiming 2^{212} message security and 2^{396} key security can barely achieve 2^{82} message security and 2^{125} key security. Our work not only provides cryptanalysis for BQTRU but also demonstrates the potential of extending Gentry’s attack to other rings beyond the cyclotomic polynomial ring.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1853
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