Welcome to the resource topic for 2024/1552
Title:
Revisiting Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials
Authors: Michele Orrù
Abstract:Keyed-verification anonymous credentials are widely recognized as among the most efficient tools for anonymous authentication. In this work, we revisit two prominent credential systems: the scheme by Chase et al. (CCS 2014), commonly referred to as CMZ or PS MAC, and the scheme by Barki et al. (SAC 2016), known as BBDT or BBS MAC. We show how to make CMZ statistically anonymous and BBDT compatible with the BBS RFC draft. We provide a comprehensive security analysis for strong(er) properties of unforgeability and anonymity. These properties allow them to be composed with extensions that users can pick and choose. We show that simpler variants satisfying one-more unforgeability can still be anonymous tokens (Kreuter et al., CRYPTO 2020).
To enable faster proofs for complex presentations, we present a compiler that uses an interactive oracle proof and a designated-verifier polynomial commitment to construct a designated-verifier non-interactive argument. For keyed-verification anonymous credentials, designated-verifier proofs suffice since the verifier is known in advance. We explore extensions that could benefit from this approach.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1552
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