Welcome to the resource topic for 2024/1454
Title:
Interval Key-Encapsulation Mechanism
Authors: Alexander Bienstock, Yevgeniy Dodis, Paul Rösler, Daniel Wichs
Abstract:Forward-Secure Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (FS-KEM; Canetti et al. Eurocrypt 2003) allows Alice to encapsulate a key k to Bob for some time t such that Bob can decapsulate it at any time t'\leq t. Crucially, a corruption of Bob’s secret key after time t does not reveal k.
In this work, we generalize and extend this idea by also taking Post-Compromise Security (PCS) into account and call it Interval Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (IKEM). Thus, we do not only protect confidentiality of previous keys against future corruptions but also confidentiality of future keys against past corruptions. For this, Bob can regularly renew his secret key and inform others about the corresponding public key. IKEM enables Bob to decapsulate keys sent to him over an interval of time extending into the past, in case senders have not obtained his latest public key; forward security only needs to hold with respect to keys encapsulated before this interval. This basic IKEM variant can be instantiated based on standard KEM, which we prove to be optimal in terms of assumptions as well as ciphertext and key sizes.
We also extend this notion of IKEM for settings in which Bob decapsulates (much) later than Alice encapsulates (e.g., in high-latency or segmented networks): if a third user Charlie forwards Alice’s ciphertext to Bob and, additionally, knows a recently renewed public key of Bob’s, Charlie could re-encrypt the ciphertext for better PCS. We call this extended notion IKEMR. Our first IKEMR construction based on trapdoor permutations has (almost) constant sized ciphertexts in the number of re-encryptions; and our second IKEMR construction based on FS-PKE has constant sized public keys in the interval size.
Finally, to bypass our lower bound on the IKEM(R) secret key size, which must be linear in the interval size, we develop a new Interval RAM primitive with which Bob only stores a constant sized part of his secret key locally, while outsourcing the rest to a (possibly adversarial) server.
For all our constructions, we achieve security against active adversaries. For this, we obtain new insights on Replayable CCA security for KEM-type primitives, which might be of independent interest.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1454
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