[Resource Topic] 2024/111: A Novel Power Analysis Attack against CRYSTALS-Dilithium Implementation

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A Novel Power Analysis Attack against CRYSTALS-Dilithium Implementation

Authors: Yong Liu, Yuejun Liu, Yongbin Zhou, Yiwen Gao, Zehua Qiao, Huaxin Wang


Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) was proposed due to the potential threats quantum computer attacks against conventional public key cryptosystems, and four PQC algorithms besides CRYSTALS-Dilithium (Dilithium for short) have so far been selected for NIST standardization. However, the selected algorithms are still vulnerable to side-channel attacks in practice, and their physical security need to be further evaluated.
This study introduces two efficient power analysis attacks, the optimized fast two-stage approach and the single-bit approach, aimed at reducing the key guess space in NTT polynomial multiplication on an STM32F405 device (ARM Cortex-M4 core).
Our findings reveal that the optimized approach outperforms the conservative approach and the fast two-stage approach proposed in ICCD 2021 by factors of 519 and 88, respectively.
Similarly, the single-bit approach demonstrates speedups of 365 and 62 times compared to these two approaches, respectively.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/111

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