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Exploiting the Central Reduction in Lattice-Based Cryptography
Authors: Tolun Tosun, amir moradi, erkay savasAbstract:
This paper presents a novel and efficient way of exploiting side-channel leakage of masked implementations of lattice-based cryptography (LBC). The presented attack specifically targets the central reduction technique, which is widely adapted in efficient implementations of LBC. We show that the central reduction leads to a vulnerability by creating a strong dependency between the power consumption and the sign of sensitive intermediate variables. We exploit this dependency by introducing a novel hypothetical power model, the range power model, which can be employed in higher-order multi-query side-channel analysis attacks. We particularly show that our approach is valid for the prime moduli employed by Kyber and Dilithium, the lattice-based post-quantum algorithms selected by NIST, while it generalizes to other primes used in LBC as well. We practically evaluate our introduced approach by performing second-order non-profiled attacks against a masked implementation of Kyber on an Arm Cortex-M4 micro-processor. In our experiments we revealed the full secret key of the aforementioned implementation with only 2100 electro-magnetic (EM) traces without profiling, achieving a more than 14 times reduction in the number of traces compared to classical attacks.
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