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Title:
Blink: Breaking Lattice-Based Schemes Implemented in Parallel with Chosen-Ciphertext Attack
Authors: Jian Wang, Weiqiong Cao, Hua Chen, Haoyuan Li
Abstract:As the message recovery-based attack poses a serious threat to lattice-based schemes, we conducted a study on the side-channel secu- rity of parallel implementations of lattice-based key encapsulation mech- anisms. Initially, we developed a power model to describe the power leakage during message encoding. Utilizing this power model, we pro- pose a multi-ciphertext message recovery attack, which can retrieve the required messages for a chosen ciphertext attack through a suitable mes- sage recovery oracle. Building upon the successful message recovery, we further develop a key recovery method based on a ciphertext-choosing strategy that maximizes key recovery accuracy, as well as a lattice reduc- tion attack capable of solving the whole private key from the target LWE instance. To assess the effectiveness of the attack, we conducted experi- ments using Kyber768 implemented on a Xilinx FPGA board. The exper- imental results demonstrate that our attack could successfully recover the private key with 9600 power traces and a computational complexity of 100 bikz, which is a significant advantage over existing attacks. Notably, our attack remains effective despite countermeasures such as masking and shuffling being implemented. This study reveals that parallel im- plementations remain vulnerable to side-channel attacks, and highlights the necessity of additional analysis and countermeasures for lattice-based schemes implemented in parallel.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/036
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