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Prouﬀ & Rivain’s Formal Security Proof of Masking, Revisited: Tight Bounds in the Noisy Leakage Model
Authors: Loïc Masure, François-Xavier StandaertAbstract:
Masking is a counter-measure that can be incorporated to
software and hardware implementations of block ciphers to provably se-
cure them against side-channel attacks. The security of masking can be
proven in diﬀerent types of threat models. In this paper, we are interested
in directly proving the security in the most realistic threat model, the
so-called noisy leakage adversary, that captures well how real-world side-
channel adversaries operate. Direct proofs in this leakage model have
been established by Prouﬀ & Rivain at Eurocrypt 2013, Dziembowski
et al. at Eurocrypt 2015, and Prest et al. at Crypto 2019. Both proofs
are complementary to each other, in the sense that the weaknesses of one
proof are ﬁxed in at least one of the others, and conversely. These weak-
nesses concerned in particular the strong requirements on the noise level
and the security parameter to get meaningful security bounds, and some
requirements on the type of adversary covered by the proof — i.e., cho-
sen or random plaintexts. This suggested that the drawbacks of each
security bound could actually be proof artifacts. In this paper, we solve
these issues, by revisiting Prouﬀ & Rivain’s approach.
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