[Resource Topic] 2023/410: Unbounded Leakage-Resilience and Leakage-Detection in a Quantum World

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Unbounded Leakage-Resilience and Leakage-Detection in a Quantum World

Authors: Alper Cakan, Vipul Goyal, Chen-Da Liu-Zhang, João Ribeiro


Side-channel attacks, which aim to leak side information on secret system components, are ubiquitous. Even simple attacks, such as measuring time elapsed or radiation emitted during encryption and decryption procedures, completely break textbook versions of many cryptographic schemes. This has prompted the study of leakage-resilient cryptography, which remains secure in the presence of side-channel attacks.

Classical leakage-resilient cryptography must necessarily impose restrictions on the type of leakage one aims to protect against. As a notable example, the most well-studied leakage model is that of bounded leakage, where it is assumed that an adversary learns at most \ell bits of leakage on secret components, for some leakage bound \ell. Although this leakage bound is necessary, it is unclear if such a bound is realistic in practice since many practical side-channel attacks cannot be captured by bounded leakage.

In this work, we investigate the possibility of designing cryptographic schemes that provide guarantees against arbitrary side-channel attacks:

  • Using techniques from uncloneable quantum cryptography, we design several basic leakage-resilient primitives, such as secret sharing, (weak) pseudorandom functions, digital signatures, and public- and private-key encryption, which remain secure under (polynomially) unbounded classical leakage. In particular, this leakage can be much longer than the (quantum) secret being leaked upon. In our view, leakage is the result of observations of quantities such as power consumption and hence is most naturally viewed as classical information.

  • In the even stronger adversarial setting where the adversary is allowed to obtain unbounded quantum leakage (and thus leakage-resilience is impossible), we design schemes for many cryptographic tasks which support leakage-detection. This means that we can efficiently check whether the security of such a scheme has been compromised by a side-channel attack. These schemes are based on techniques from cryptography with certified deletion.

  • We also initiate a study of classical cryptographic schemes with (bounded) post-quantum leakage-resilience. These schemes resist side-channel attacks performed by adversaries with quantum capabilities which may even share arbitrary entangled quantum states. That is, even if such adversaries are non-communicating, they can still have “spooky” communication via entangled states.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/410

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