[Resource Topic] 2023/1790: Compromising sensitive information through Padding Oracle and Known Plaintext attacks in Encrypt-then-TLS scenarios

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Title:
Compromising sensitive information through Padding Oracle and Known Plaintext attacks in Encrypt-then-TLS scenarios

Authors: Daniel Espinoza Figueroa

Abstract:

Let’s consider a scenario where the server encrypts data using AES-CBC without authentication and then sends only the encrypted ciphertext through TLS (without IV). Then, having a padding oracle, we managed to recover the initialization vector and the sensitive data, doing a cybersecurity audit for a Chilean company.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1790

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