Welcome to the resource topic for 2023/157
Title:
A Key-Recovery Attack against Mitaka in the t-Probing Model
Authors: Thomas Prest
Abstract:Mitaka is a lattice-based signature proposed at Eurocrypt 2022. A key advertised feature of Mitaka is that it can be masked at high orders efficiently, making it attractive in scenarios where side-channel attacks are a concern. Mitaka comes with a claimed security proof in the t-probing model.
We uncover a flaw in the security proof of Mitaka, and subsequently show that it is not secure in the t-probing model. For any number of shares d ≥ 4, probing t < d variables per execution allows an attacker to recover the private key efficiently with approximately 221 executions. Our analysis shows that even a constant number of probes suffices (t = 3), as long as the attacker has access to a number of executions that is linear in d/t.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/157
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