[Resource Topic] 2023/1336: Riggs: Decentralized Sealed-Bid Auctions

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Riggs: Decentralized Sealed-Bid Auctions

Authors: Nirvan Tyagi, Arasu Arun, Cody Freitag, Riad Wahby, Joseph Bonneau, David Mazières


We introduce the first practical protocols for fully decentralized
sealed-bid auctions using timed commitments. Timed commitments
ensure that the auction is finalized fairly even if all participants drop
out after posting bids or if n-1 bidders collude to try to learn the
n^{th} bidder’s bid value. Our protocols rely on a novel non-malleable
timed commitment scheme which efficiently supports range proofs
to establish that bidders have sufficient funds to cover a hidden
bid value. This allows us to penalize users who abandon bids for
exactly the bid value, while supporting simultaneous bidding in
multiple auctions with a shared collateral pool. Our protocols are
concretely efficient and we have implemented them in an Ethereum-
compatible smart contract which automatically enforces payment
and delivery of an auctioned digital asset.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1336

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