Welcome to the resource topic for 2023/1184
Title:
STAMP-Single Trace Attack on M-LWE Pointwise Multiplication in Kyber
Authors: Bolin Yang, Prasanna Ravi, Fan Zhang, Ao Shen, Shivam Bhasin
Abstract:In this work, we propose a novel single-trace key recovery attack targeting side-channel leakage from the key-generation procedure of Kyber KEM. Our attack exploits the inherent nature of the Module-Learning With Errors (Module-LWE) problem used in Kyber KEM. We demonstrate that the inherent reliance of Kyber KEM on the Module-LWE problem results in a higher number of repeated computations with the secret key, compared to the Ring-LWE problem of similar security level. We exploit leakage from the pointwise multiplication operation in the key-generation procedure, and take advantage of the properties of the Module-LWE instance to enable a potential single trace key recovery attack. We validated the efficacy of our attack on both simulated and real traces, and we performed experiments on both the reference and assembly optimized implementation of Kyber KEM, taken from the pqm4 library, a well-known benchmarking and testing framework for PQC schemes on the ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. We also analyze the applicability of our attack on the countermeasures against traditional SCA such as masking and shuffling. We believe our work motivates more research towards SCA resistant implementation of key-generation procedure for Kyber KEM.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1184
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