[Resource Topic] 2023/1068: Optical Cryptanalysis: Recovering Cryptographic Keys from Power LED Light Fluctuations

Welcome to the resource topic for 2023/1068

Title:
Optical Cryptanalysis: Recovering Cryptographic Keys from Power LED Light Fluctuations

Authors: Ben Nassi, Ofek Vayner, Etay Iluz, Dudi Nassi, Or Hai Cohen, Jan Jancar, Daniel Genkin, Eran Tromer, Boris Zadov, Yuval Elovici

Abstract:

Although power LEDs have been integrated in various
devices that perform cryptographic operations for decades, the
cryptanalysis risk they pose has not yet been investigated.
In this paper, we present optical cryptanalysis, a new form
of cryptanalytic side-channel attack, in which secret keys are
extracted by using a photodiode to measure the light emitted
by a device’s power LED and analyzing subtle fluctuations in
the light intensity during cryptographic operations. We analyze
the optical leakage of power LEDs of various consumer
devices and the factors that affect the optical SNR. We then
demonstrate end-to-end optical cryptanalytic attacks against
a range of consumer devices (smartphone, smartcard, and
Raspberry Pi, along with their USB peripherals) and recover
secret keys (RSA, ECDSA, SIKE) from prior and recent
versions of popular cryptographic libraries (GnuPG, Libgcrypt,
PQCrypto-SIDH) from a maximum distance of 25 meters

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1068

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