Welcome to the resource topic for 2022/1416
Title:
Side-Channel Attack Countermeasures Based On Clock Randomization Have a Fundamental Flaw
Authors: Martin Brisfors, Michail Moraitis, Elena Dubrova
Abstract:Clock randomization is one of the oldest countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Various implementations have been presented in the past, along with positive security evaluations. However, in this paper we show that it is possible to break countermeasures based on a randomized clock by sampling side-channel measurements at a frequency much higher than the encryption clock, synchronizing the traces with pre-processing, and targeting the beginning of the encryption.
We demonstrate a deep learning-based side-channel attack on a protected FPGA implementation of AES which can recover a subkey from less than 500 power traces.
In contrast to previous attacks on FPGA implementations of AES which targeted the last round, the presented attack uses the first round as the attack point.
Any randomized clock countermeasure is significantly weakened by an attack on the first round because the effect of randomness accumulated over multiple encryption rounds is lost.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1416
See all topics related to this paper.
Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.
Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.
For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .