[Resource Topic] 2022/859: Practical Side-Channel Attack on Masked Message Encoding in Latticed-Based KEM

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Practical Side-Channel Attack on Masked Message Encoding in Latticed-Based KEM

Authors: Jian Wang, Weiqiong Cao, Hua Chen, and Haoyuan Li


To defend against the rising threat of quantum computers, NIST initiated their Post-Quantum Cryptography(PQC) standardization process in 2016. During the PQC process, the security against side-channel attacks has received much attention. Lattice-based schemes are considered to be the most promising group to be standardized. Message encoding in lattice-based schemes has been proven to be vulnerable to side-channel attacks, and a first-order masked message encoder has been presented. However, there is still a lack of security evaluation for the first-order masked message encoder under different implementations. In this paper, we analyzed the security of the first-order masked message encoder of Kyber. We found although masked Kyber certainly is able to defend against the previous side-channel attacks, there still exist some exploitable leakages. With the help of the leakages, we proposed a deep learning-based key recovery attack on message encoding of masked Kyber. Our method can recover the original message from masked message encoding and then enable a chosen-ciphertext attack to recover the secret key. In our experiments, the whole secret key of masked Kyber768 was recovered with only 9 traces and the success rate of attack was close to 100%.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/859

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