Welcome to the resource topic for 2022/700
Title:
Grief-free Atomic Swaps
Authors: Tejaswi Nadahalli, Majid Khabbazian, and Roger Wattenhofer
Abstract:Atomic Swaps enable exchanging crypto-assets without trusting a third party. To enable these swaps, both parties lock funds and let their counterparty withdraw them in exchange for a secret. This leads to the so-called griefing attack, or the emergence of an American Call option, where one party stops participating in the swap, thereby making their counterparty wait for a timelock to expire before they can withdraw their funds. The standard way to mitigate this attack is to make the attacker pay a premium for the emerging American Call option. In these premium-paying approaches, the premium itself ends up being locked for possibly an even longer duration than the swap amount itself. We propose a new Atomic Swap construction, where neither party exposes itself to a griefing attack by their counterparty. Notably, unlike previous constructions, ours can be implemented in Bitcoin as is. Our construction also takes fewer on-chain transactions and has a lower worst-case timelock.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/700
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