Welcome to the resource topic for 2022/467
Title:
Armistice: Micro-Architectural Leakage Modelling for Masked Software Formal Verification
Authors: Arnaud de Grandmaison, Karine Heydemann, and Quentin L. Meunier
Abstract:Side channel attacks are powerful attacks for retrieving secret data by exploiting physical measurements such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions. Masking is a popular countermeasure as it can be proven secure against an attacker model. In practice, software masked implementations suffer from a security reduction due to a mismatch between the considered leakage sources in the security proof and the real ones, which depend on the micro-architecture. We present the model of a system comprising an Arm Cortex-M3 obtained from its RTL description and test-vectors, as well as a model of the memory of a STM32F1 board, built exclusively using test-vectors. Based on these models, we propose Armistice, a framework for formally verifying the absence of leakage in first-order masked implementations taking into account the modelled micro-architectural sources of leakage. We show that Armistice enables to pinpoint vulnerable instructions in real world masked implementations and helps design masked software implementations which are practically secure.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/467
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