[Resource Topic] 2022/148: Attacks on the Firekite cipher

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Title:
Attacks on the Firekite cipher

Authors: Thomas Johansson, Willi Meier, and Vu Nguyen

Abstract:

Firekite is a synchronous stream cipher using a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) whose security relies on the hardness of the \textit{Learning Parity with Noise} (LPN) problem. It is one of a few LPN-based symmetric encryption schemes and it can be very efficiently implemented on a low-end SoC FPGA. The designers, Bogos, Korolija, Locher, and Vaudenay, demonstrated appealing properties of Firekite such as requiring only one source of cryptographically strong bits, small key size, high attainable throughput, and a concrete measurement for the bit level security depending on the selected practical parameters. We propose distinguishing and key-recovery attacks on Firekite by exploiting the structural properties of its PRNG. We adopt several \textit{birthday-paradox} techniques to show that a particular sum of Firekite’s output has a low Hamming weight with higher probability than the random case. We achieve the best distinguishing attacks with complexities 2^{66.75} and 2^{106.75} for Firekite’s parameters corresponding to 80-bit and 128-bit security, respectively. By applying the distinguishing attacks and an additionally suggested algorithm, one can also recover the secret matrix used in the Firekite PRNG, which is built from the secret key bits. This key recovery attack works on most large parameter sets and has slightly larger complexity, for example 2^{69.87} on the 80-bit security parameters n=16384, m = 216, k = 216.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/148

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