Welcome to the resource topic for 2021/840
Title:
Fault-Injection Attacks against NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography Round 3 KEM Candidates
Authors: Keita Xagawa, Akira Ito, Rei Ueno, Junko Takahashi, Naofumi Homma
Abstract:We investigate all NIST PQC Round 3 KEM candidates from the viewpoint of fault-injection attacks: Classic McEliece, Kyber, NTRU, Saber, BIKE, FrodoKEM, HQC, NTRU Prime, and SIKE. All KEM schemes use variants of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, so the equality test with re-encryption in decapsulation is critical. We survey effective key-recovery attacks when we can skip the equality test. We found the existing key-recovery attacks against Kyber, NTRU, Saber, FrodoKEM, HQC, one of two KEM schemes in NTRU Prime, and SIKE. We propose a new key-recovery attack against the other KEM scheme in NTRU Prime. We also report an attack against BIKE that leads to leakage of information of secret keys. The open-source pqm4 library contains all KEM schemes except Classic McEliece and HQC. We show that giving a single instruction-skipping fault in the decapsulation processes leads to skipping the equality test virtually for Kyber, NTRU, Saber, BIKE, and SIKE. We also report the experimental attacks against them. We also report the implementation of NTRU Prime allows chosen-ciphertext attacks freely and the timing side-channel of FrodoKEM reported in Guo, Johansson, and Nilsson (CRYPTO 2020) remains, while there are no such bugs in their NIST PQC Round 3 submissions.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/840
Talk: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9AFj6zJ_5bk
Slides: https://iacr.org/submit/files/slides/2021/asiacrypt/asiacrypt2021/205/slides.pdf
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