[Resource Topic] 2021/602: Autonomous Secure Remote Attestation even when all Used and to be Used Digital Keys Leak

Welcome to the resource topic for 2021/602

Title:
Autonomous Secure Remote Attestation even when all Used and to be Used Digital Keys Leak

Authors: Marten van Dijk, Deniz Gurevin, Chenglu Jin, Omer Khan, Phuong Ha Nguyen

Abstract:

We provide a new remote attestation scheme for secure processor technology, which is secure in the presence of an All Digital State Observing (ADSO) adversary. To accomplish this, we obfuscate session signing keys using a silicon Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) with an extended interface that combines the LPN-PUF concept with a repetition code for small failure probabilities, and we introduce a new signature scheme that only needs a message dependent subset of a session signing key for computing a signature and whose signatures cannot be successfully forged even if one subset per session signing key leaks. Our solution for remote attestation shows that results computed by enclaves can be properly verified even when an ADSO-adversary is present. For N=2^l sessions, implementation results show that signing takes 934.9+0.6\cdot l ms and produces a signature of 8.2+0.03\cdot l KB, and verification by a remote user takes 118.2+0.4\cdot l ms. During initialization, generation of all session keys takes 819.3 \cdot N ms and corresponding storage is 3 \cdot 10^{-5} + 0.12 \cdot N MB.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/602

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