Welcome to the resource topic for 2021/395
Title:
On the Validity of Spoofing Attack Against Safe is the New Smart
Authors: Harishma Boyapally, Urbi Chatterjee, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay
Abstract:Recently, a light-weight authenticated key-exchange (AKE) scheme has been proposed. The scheme provides mutual authentication. It is asymmetric in nature by delegating complex cryptographic operations to resource-equipped servers, and carefully managing the workload on resource-constrained Smart meter nodes by using Physically Unclonable Functions. The prototype Smart meter built using commercial-off-the-shelf products is enabled with a low-cost countermeasure against load-modification attacks, which goes side-by-side with the proposed protocol. An attack against this AKE scheme has been recently proposed claiming that the server can be breached to mount spoofing attacks. It relies on the assumption that the result of an attack against authenticated key-exchange protocol is determined before the attacker learns the session key. In this short paper, we discuss the attack’s validity and describe the misinterpretation of the AKE protocol’s security definition.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/395
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