[Resource Topic] 2021/1542: An End-to-End Bitstream Tamper Attack Against Flip-Chip FPGAs

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An End-to-End Bitstream Tamper Attack Against Flip-Chip FPGAs

Authors: Fahim Rahman, Farimah Farahmandi, Mark Tehranipoor


FPGA bitstream encryption and authentication can be defeated by various techniques and it is critical to understand how these vulnerabilities enable extraction and tampering of commercial FPGA bitstreams. We exploit the physical vulnerability of bitstream encryption keys to readout using failure analysis equipment and conduct an end-to-end bitstream tamper attack. Our work underscores the feasibility of supply chain bitstream tampering and the necessity of guarding against such attacks in critical systems.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1542

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