[Resource Topic] 2021/1405: Leaking Arbitrarily Many Secrets: Any-out-of-Many Proofs and Applications to RingCT Protocols

Welcome to the resource topic for 2021/1405

Title:
Leaking Arbitrarily Many Secrets: Any-out-of-Many Proofs and Applications to RingCT Protocols

Authors: Tianyu Zheng, Shang Gao, Bin Xiao, Yubo Song

Abstract:

In this paper, we propose any-out-of-many proofs, a logarithmic zero-knowledge scheme for proving knowledge of arbitrarily many secrets out of a public list. Unlike existing k-out-of-N proofs [S\&P’21, CRYPTO’21], our approach also hides the exact amount of secrets k, which can be used to achieve a higher anonymity level. Furthermore, we enhance the efficiency of our scheme through a transformation that can adopt the improved inner product argument in Bulletproofs [S\&P’18], only 2 \cdot \lceil log_2(N) \rceil + 13 elements need to be sent in a non-interactive proof. We further use our proof scheme to implement both multiple ring signature schemes and RingCT protocols. For multiple ring signatures, we need to add a boundary constraint for the number k to avoid the proof of an empty secret set. Thus, an improved version called bounded any-out-of-many proof is presented, which preserves all nice features of the original protocol such as high anonymity and logarithmic size. As for the RingCT, both the original and bounded proofs can be used safely. The result of the performance evaluation indicates that our RingCT protocol is more efficient and secure than others. We also believe our techniques are applicable in other privacy-preserving occasions.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1405

See all topics related to this paper.

Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.

Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.

For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .