Welcome to the resource topic for 2020/855
Title:
Fooling primality tests on smartcards
Authors: Vladimir Sedlacek, Jan Jancar, Petr Svenda
Abstract:We analyse whether the smartcards of the JavaCard platform correctly validate primality of domain parameters. The work is inspired by the paper Prime and prejudice: primality testing under adversarial conditions, where the authors analysed many open-source libraries and constructed pseudoprimes fooling the primality testing functions. However, in the case of smartcards, often there is no way to invoke the primality test directly, so we trigger it by replacing (EC)DSA and (EC)DH prime domain parameters by adversarial composites. Such a replacement results in vulnerability to Pohlig-Hellman style attacks, leading to private key recovery. Out of nine smartcards (produced by five major manufacturers) we tested, all but one have no primality test in parameter validation. As the JavaCard platform provides no public primality testing API, the problem cannot be fixed by an extra parameter check, %an additional check before the parameters are passed to existing (EC)DSA and (EC)DH functions, making it difficult to mitigate in already deployed smartcards.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/855
See all topics related to this paper.
Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.
Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.
For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .