Welcome to the resource topic for 2020/1595
Title:
Attacks on Beyond-Birthday-Bound MACs in the Quantum Setting
Authors: Tingting Guo, Peng Wang, Lei Hu, Dingfeng Ye
Abstract:We systematically study the security of twelve Beyond-Birthday-Bound Message Authentication Codes (BBB MACs) in the Q2 model where attackers have quantum-query access to MACs. Assuming the block size of the underlying (tweakable) block cipher is n bits, the security proofs show that they are secure at least up to \mathcal{O}(2^ {2n/3}) queries in the classical setting. The best classical attacks need \mathcal{O}(2^ {3n/4}) queries. We consider secret state recovery against SUM-ECBC-like and PMAC_Plus-like MACs and key recovery against PMAC_Plus-like MACs. Both attacks lead to successful forgeries. The first attack costs \mathcal{O}(2^{n/2}n) quantum queries by applying Grover-meet-Simon algorithm. The second attack costs \mathcal{O}(2^{m/2}) quantum queries by applying Grover’s algorithm, assuming the key size of (tweakable) block cipher is m bits. As far as we know, these are the first quantum attacks against BBB MACs. It is remarkable that our attacks are suitable even for some optimally secure MACs, such as mPMAC±f, mPMAC±p1, and mPMAC±p2.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1595
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