[Resource Topic] 2020/1559: On Exploiting Message Leakage in (few) NIST PQC Candidates for Practical Message Recovery and Key Recovery Attacks

Welcome to the resource topic for 2020/1559

Title:
On Exploiting Message Leakage in (few) NIST PQC Candidates for Practical Message Recovery and Key Recovery Attacks

Authors: Prasanna Ravi, Shivam Bhasin, Sujoy Sinha Roy, Anupam Chattopadhyay

Abstract:

With the NIST Post quantum cryptography competition in final round, the importance of implementation security is highlighted in the latest call. In this regard, we report practical side-channel assisted message recovery attacks over embedded implementations of several post-quantum public key encryption (PKE) and key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) based on the Learning With Errors (LWE) and Learning With Rounding (LWR) problem, which include three finalists and three semi-finalist candidates of the NIST standardization process. The proposed attacks target storage of the decrypted message in memory, a basic operation found in all libraries and typically unavoidable in any embedded implementation. We also identify interesting ciphertext malleability properties for LWE/LWR-based PKEs and exploit them to generalise proposed attack to different implementation choices as well as implementations protected with side-channel countermeasures such as shuffling and masking. All proposed attacks are validated on ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller, targeting optimized open source implementations of PQC schemes using electromagnetic side-channel measurements.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1559

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