[Resource Topic] 2020/1455: An Analytic Attack Against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-Channel Leakage

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Title:
An Analytic Attack Against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-Channel Leakage

Authors: Yan Yan, Elisabeth Oswald, Srinivas Vivek

Abstract:

In the last few years a new design paradigm, the so-called ARX (modular addition, rotation, exclusive-or) ciphers, have gained popularity in part because of their non-linear operation’s seemingly `inherent resilience’ against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) Attacks: the non-linear modular addition is not only known to be a poor target for DPA attacks, but also the computational complexity of DPA-style attacks grows exponentially with the operand size and thus DPA-style attacks quickly become practically infeasible. We however propose a novel DPA-style attack strategy that scales linearly with respect to the operand size in the chosen-message attack setting.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1455

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