[Resource Topic] 2019/909: A Practicable Timing Attack Against HQC and its Countermeasure

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Title:
A Practicable Timing Attack Against HQC and its Countermeasure

Authors: Guillaume Wafo-Tapa, Slim Bettaieb, Loic Bidoux, Philippe Gaborit, Etienne Marcatel

Abstract:

In this paper, we present a practicable chosen ciphertext timing attack retrieving the secret key of HQC. The attack exploits a correlation between the weight of the error to be decoded and the running time of the decoding algorithm of BCH codes. For the 128-bit security parameters of HQC, the attack runs in less than a minute on a desktop computer using 5441 decoding requests and has a success probability of approximately 93 percent. To prevent this attack, we propose a constant time algorithm for the decoding of BCH codes. Our implementation of the countermeasure achieves a constant time execution of the decoding process without a significant performance penalty.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/909

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