[Resource Topic] 2019/761: Athena: A verifiable, coercion-resistant voting system with linear complexity

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Title:
Athena: A verifiable, coercion-resistant voting system with linear complexity

Authors: Ben Smyth

Abstract:

Seminal work by Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson delivered a verifiable, coercion-resistant voting system with quadratic complexity. This manuscript attempts to advance the state-of-the-art by delivering a voting system with equivalent security and linear complexity.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/761

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