Welcome to the resource topic for 2019/756
Title:
SKIVA: Flexible and Modular Side-channel and Fault Countermeasures
Authors: Pantea Kiaei, Darius Mercadier, Pierre-Evariste Dagand, Karine Heydemann, Patrick Schaumont
Abstract:We describe SKIVA, a customized 32-bit processor enabling the design of software countermeasures for a broad range of implementation attacks covering fault injection and side-channel analysis of timing-based and power-based leakage. We design the countermeasures as variants of bitslice programming. Our protection scheme is flexible and modular, allowing us to combine higher-order masking – fending off side-channel analysis – with complementary spatial and temporal redundancy – protecting against fault injection. Multiple configurations of side-channel and fault protection enable the programmer to select the desired number of shares and the desired redundancy level for each slice. Recurring and security-sensitive operations are supported in hardware through a custom instruction set extension. The new instructions support bitslicing, secret-share generation, redundant logic computation, and fault detection. We demonstrate and analyze multiple versions of AES from a side-channel analysis and a fault-injection perspective, in addition to providing a detailed performance evaluation of the protected designs.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/756
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