[Resource Topic] 2019/652: The Exchange Attack: How to Distinguish Six Rounds of AES with $2^{88.2}$ chosen plaintexts

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Title:
The Exchange Attack: How to Distinguish Six Rounds of AES with 2^{88.2} chosen plaintexts

Authors: Navid Ghaedi Bardeh, Sondre Rønjom

Abstract:

In this paper we present exchange-equivalence attacks which is a new cryptanalytic attack technique suitable for SPN-like block cipher designs. Our new technique results in the first secret-key chosen plaintext distinguisher for 6-round AES. The complexity of the distinguisher is about 2^{88.2} in terms of data, memory and computational complexity. The distinguishing attack for AES reduced to six rounds is a straight-forward extension of an exchange attack for 5-round AES that requires 2^{30} in terms of chosen plaintexts and computation. This is also a new record for AES reduced to five rounds. The main result of this paper is that AES up to at least six rounds is biased when restricted to exchange-invariant sets of plaintexts.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/652

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