Welcome to the resource topic for 2019/1424
Title:
Efficient Side-Channel Secure Message Authentication with Better Bounds
Authors: Chun Guo, François-Xavier Standaert, Weijia Wang, Yu Yu
Abstract:We investigate constructing message authentication schemes from symmetric cryptographic primitives, with the goal of achieving security when most intermediate values during tag computation and verification are leaked (i.e., mode-level leakage-resilience). Existing efficient proposals typically follow the plain Hash-then-MAC paradigm T=MAC_K(H(M)). When the domain of the MAC function MAC_K is \{0,1\}^{128}, e.g., when instantiated with the AES, forgery is possible within time 2^{64} and data complexity 1. To dismiss such cheap attacks, we propose two modes: LRW1-based Hash-then-MAC (LRWHM) that is built upon the LRW1 tweakable blockcipher of Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner, and Rekeying Hash-then-MAC (RHM) that employs internal rekeying. Built upon secure AES implementations, LRWHM is provably secure up to (beyond-birthday) 2^{78.3} time complexity, while RHM is provably secure up to 2^{121} time. Thus in practice, their main security threat is expected to be side-channel key recovery attacks against the AES implementations. Finally, we benchmark the performance of instances of our modes based on the AES and SHA3 and confirm their efficiency.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1424
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