[Resource Topic] 2019/1392: Decryption failure is more likely after success

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Decryption failure is more likely after success

Authors: Nina Bindel, John M. Schanck


The user of an imperfectly correct lattice-based public-key encryption scheme leaks information about their secret key with each decryption query that they answer—even if they answer all queries successfully. Through a refinement of the D’Anvers–Guo–Johansson–Nilsson–Vercauteren–Verbauwhede failure boosting attack, we show that an adversary can use this information to improve his odds of finding a decryption failure. We also propose a new definition of \delta-correctness, and we re-assess the correctness of several submissions to NIST’s post-quantum standardization effort.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1392

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