Welcome to the resource topic for 2019/1236
Title:
Single-Trace Vulnerability of Countermeasures against Instruction-related Timing Attack
Authors: Bo-Yeon Sim, Dong-Guk Han
Abstract:In this paper, we propose that countermeasures against instruction-related timing attack would be vulnerable to single-trace attacks, which are presented at ISPEC 2017 and CHES 2019. The countermeasures use determiner to make operations, which leak timing side-channel information, perform in a constant-time. Since determiner is divided into two groups according to secret credentials, it is possible to recover secret credentials by clustering determiner into two groups.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1236
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