[Resource Topic] 2019/1153: Stronger Security and Constructions of Multi-Designated Verifier Signatures

Welcome to the resource topic for 2019/1153

Stronger Security and Constructions of Multi-Designated Verifier Signatures

Authors: Ivan Damgård, Helene Haagh, Rebekah Mercer, Anca Nițulescu, Claudio Orlandi, Sophia Yakoubov


Off-the-Record (OTR) messaging is a two-party message authentication protocol that also provides plausible deniability: there is no record that can later convince a third party what messages were actually sent. To extend OTR to group messaging we need to consider issues that are not present in the 2-party case. In group OTR (as in two-party OTR), the sender should be able to authenticate (or sign) his messages so that group members can verify who sent a message (that is, signatures should be unforgeable, even by group members). Also as in the two-party case, we want the off-the-record property: even if some verifiers are corrupt and collude, they should not be able to prove the authenticity of a message to any outsider. Finally, we need consistency, meaning that a corrupt sender cannot create confusion in the group as to what he said: if any group member accepts a signature, then all of them do. To achieve these properties it is natural to consider Multi-Designated Verifier Signatures (MDVS), which intuitively seem to target exactly the properties we require. However, existing literature defines and builds only limited notions of MDVS, where (a) the off-the-record property (referred to as source hiding) only holds when all verifiers could conceivably collude, and (b) the consistency property is not considered. The contributions of this paper are two-fold: stronger definitions for MDVS, and new constructions meeting those definitions. We strengthen source-hiding to support any subset of corrupt verifiers, and give the first formal definition of consistency. We give several constructions of our stronger notion of MDVS: one from generic standard primitives such as pseudorandom functions, pseudorandom generators, key agreement and NIZKs; one from specific instances of these primitives (for concrete efficiency); and one from functional encryption. The third construction requires an involved trusted setup step — including verification keys derived from a master secret — but this trusted setup buys us verifier-identity-based signing, for which such trusted setup is unavoidable. Additionally, in the third construction, the signature size can be made smaller by assuming a bound on colluding verifiers.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1153

Talk: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJqK9zJ10iA

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