Welcome to the resource topic for 2018/999
Title:
A Refinement of ``A Key-recovery Attack on 855-round Trivium" From CRYPTO 2018
Authors: Ximing Fu, Xiaoyun Wang, Xiaoyang Dong, Willi Meier, Yonglin Hao, Boxin Zhao
Abstract:At CRYPTO 2018, we proposed a method to reduce the Boolean polynomial of 855-round Trivium. By multiplying a polynomial reduction factor, the output Boolean polynomial is simplified. Based on this method, a 855-round key-recovery attack on Trivium is introduced. In addition, we also give a practical attack on 721-round Trivium to show some rationality and evidence. However, Yonglin Hao et al. find some errors in the 721-round attack recently. As a correction, we propose some new right 721-round example attacks based on our method proposed at CRYPTO 2018.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/999
See all topics related to this paper.
Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.
Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.
For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .