[Resource Topic] 2018/357: Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks on Masked AES with Fault Countermeasures

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Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks on Masked AES with Fault Countermeasures

Authors: Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Hannes Gross, Stefan Mangard, Florian Mendel, Robert Primas


Implementation attacks like side-channel and fault attacks are a threat to deployed devices especially if an attacker has physical access. As a consequence, devices like smart cards and IoT devices usually provide countermeasures against implementation attacks, such as masking against side-channel attacks and detection-based countermeasures like temporal or spacial redundancy against fault attacks. In this paper, we show how to attack implementations protected with both masking and detection-based fault countermeasures by using statistical ineffective fault attacks using a single fault induction per execution. Our attacks are largely unaffected by the deployed protection order of masking and the level of redundancy of the detection-based countermeasure. These observations show that the combination of masking plus error detection alone may not provide sufficient protection against implementation attacks.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/357

Slides: https://asiacrypt.iacr.org/2018/files/SLIDES/WEDNESDAY/P421/0850-1030/Robert_slides.pdf

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