Welcome to the resource topic for 2017/926
Title:
How to Construct a Leakage-Resilient (Stateless) Trusted Party
Authors: Daniel Genkin, Yual Ishai, Mor Weiss
Abstract:Trusted parties and devices are commonly used in the real world to securely perform computations on secret inputs. However, their security can often be compromised by side-channel attacks in which the adversary obtains partial leakage on intermediate computation values. This gives rise to the following natural question: To what extent can one protect the trusted party against leakage? Our goal is to design a hardware device T that allows m\ge 1 parties to securely evaluate a function f(x_1,\ldots,x_m) of their inputs by feeding T with encoded inputs that are obtained using local secret randomness. Security should hold even in the presence of an active adversary that can corrupt a subset of parties and obtain restricted leakage on the internal computations in T. We design hardware devices T in this setting both for zero-knowledge proofs and for general multi-party computations. Our constructions can unconditionally resist either AC^0 leakage or a strong form of ``only computation leaks’’ (OCL) leakage that captures realistic side-channel attacks, providing different tradeoffs between efficiency and security.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/926
See all topics related to this paper.
Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.
Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.
For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .