[Resource Topic] 2017/596: A Side-Channel Assisted Cryptanalytic Attack Against QcBits

Welcome to the resource topic for 2017/596

A Side-Channel Assisted Cryptanalytic Attack Against QcBits

Authors: Mélissa Rossi, Mike Hamburg, Michael Hutter, Mark E. Marson


QcBits is a code-based public key algorithm based on a problem thought to be resistant to quantum computer attacks. It is a constant time implementation for a quasi-cyclic moderate density parity check (QC-MDPC) Niederreiter encryption scheme, and has excellent performance and small key sizes. In this paper, we present a key recovery attack against QcBits. We first used differential power analysis (DPA) against the syndrome computation of the decoding algorithm to recover partial information about one half of the private key. We then used the recovered information to set up a system of noisy binary linear equations. Solving this system of equations gave us the entire key. Finally, we propose a simple but effective countermeasure against the power analysis used during the syndrome calculation.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/596

See all topics related to this paper.

Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.

Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.

For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .