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Title:
MXPUF: Secure PUF Design against State-of-the-art Modeling Attacks
Authors: Phuong Ha Nguyen, Durga Prasad Sahoo, Chenglu Jin, Kaleel Mahmood, Marten van Dijk
Abstract:Silicon Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been proposed as an emerging hardware security primitive in various security applications such as device identification, authentication, and cryptographic key generation. Current so-called `strong’ PUFs, which allow a large challenge response space, are compositions of Arbiter PUFs (APUFs), e.g. the x-XOR APUF. Wide-scale deployment of state-of-the-art compositions of APUFs, however, has stagnated due to various mathematical and physical attacks leading to software models that break the unclonability property of PUFs. The current state-of-the-art attack by Becker, CHES 2015, shows that the XOR APUF can be broken by modeling its APUF components separately thanks to CMA-ES, a machine learning algorithm, based on reliability information of measured XOR APUF responses. Thus, it is an important problem to design a strong PUF which can resist not only traditional modeling attacks but also Becker’s attack. In this paper, we propose a new strong PUF design called (x,y)-MXPUF, which consists of two layers; the upper layer is an n-bit x-XOR APUF, and the lower layer is an (n+1)-bit y-XOR APUF. The response of x-XOR APUF for an n-bit challenge \mathbf{c} in the upper layer is inserted at the middle of \mathbf{c} to construct a new (n+1)-bit challenge for the y-XOR APUF in the lower layer giving the final response bit of the (x,y)-MXPUF. The reliability of (x,y)-MXPUF can be theoretically and experimentally shown to be twice the reliability of (x+y)-XOR PUF. In the context of traditional modeling attacks, when we keep the same hardware size, the security of (x,y)-MXPUF is only slightly weaker than that of (x+y)-XOR PUF. Our main contribution proves that the (x,y)-MXPUF is secure against Becker’s attack.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/572
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