[Resource Topic] 2017/476: Forward-Security under Continual Leakage

Welcome to the resource topic for 2017/476

Title:
Forward-Security under Continual Leakage

Authors: Mihir Bellare, Adam O'Neill, Igors Stepanovs

Abstract:

Current signature and encryption schemes secure against continual leakage fail completely if the key in any time period is fully exposed. We suggest forward security as a second line of defense, so that in the event of full exposure of the current secret key, at least uses of keys prior to this remain secure, a big benefit in practice. (For example if the signer is a certificate authority, full exposure of the current secret key would not invalidate certificates signed under prior keys.) We provide definitions for signatures and encryption that are forward-secure under continual leakage. Achieving these definitions turns out to be challenging, and we make initial progress with some constructions and transforms.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/476

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